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Man's flight to the moon will undoubtedly rank in 
the annals of history as being one of the greatest techno­
logical achievements of this century. Never before has 
man taken such tremendous strides to break away from the 
earth's gravitational forces to explore space as he has 
done over the last decade. Certainly, future generations 
all over the world will look back upon this event and 
realize the impact it has had upon furthering United States 
preeminence in space. Nevertheless, despite the overall 
impact that the space program and the lunar landing have 
had on United States prestige among world powers, interest 
in space exploration has been rapidly declining. As a 
result, the civilian space program under the direction of 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
has been suffering from a massive slowdown since 19^7 .
As far back as I968, space employment nationwide 
declined to 220,000 in I968 from a peak of 420,000 the year 
before. This trend has continued up to the present, with 
workers being terminated daily in space centers all across 
the country. Even scientists and engineers, who have had 
years of training and experience in space technology, are 
now flocking to other Jobs. NASA's budget has been cut
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deeply from a high of 5*9 billion in 1966 to a present 
low of 3.7 billion, and most of that has been earmarked to 
clean up the Apollo Moon Project. In response to this 
devastating budget decrease in NASA’s operations, important 
segments of the four billion dollar capital Investment in 
plants and test centers by NASA are operating below capacity 
and are possibly threatened with closure. At present no 
large civilian projects, with the exception of "Skylab,** 
a permanent orbital laboratory, are planned now that Ameri­
cans have reached the moon. Consequently, NASA continues 
to lose public support as well as crucial appropriations 
from Congress.
Such a slowdown is highly unprecedented in NASA’s 
history. In fact, NASA experienced unusually rapid growth 
up to 1966, when finally its unparalleled expansion began 
to wane. This rapid growth can easily be seen in Figure 1, 
which reviews NASA’s increasing space budget from 1958 to 
1966, and its decreasing budget thereafter. Projects such 
as the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs were funded with 
little resistance from Congressmen. Space exploration and 
technology became the focal point of the American public 
as well as the aerospace industries, which became eager to 
secure laige space contracts. Companies such as North 
American Aviation (now North American Rockwell), Boeing, 
Martin-Marrietta, McDonnell, and others which had normally 
dealt with defense contracts, could scarcely overlook
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Figure 1. Expenditures for Research and Development
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the pleasant public image offered by "peaceful” contracts 
that were associated with a trip to the moon, not to mention 
the enormous profits Involved in the transactions • Thus 
did NASA experience overwhelming support from the President 
and Congress, the American public, and the space industry. 
With such strong external support, the civilian space agency 
faced little opposition from competing bureaus, e.g., the 
Defense Department, during the first part of the last decade.
Such rapid growth for a young agency is very 
unusual because most bureaus experience only gradual 
development until they are older and able to establish 
themselves. A young bureau's external sources of support 
are usually weak, or not accustomed to relations with the 
agency- Thus, the bureau must be able to demonstrate that 
its services are worthwhile to some group with influence 
over sufficient resources to keep it alive. Once the 
suppliers and beneficiaries of a bureau's services become 
convinced of their gains from it, and develop routinized 
relationships with it, the bureau can rely upon them for 
the support it needs. Eventually, the bureau's suppliers 
and beneficiaries become automatic support generators.
NASA, on the other hand, was unusual because it 
achieved this outside support from its suppliers and bene­
ficiaries, i.e., the President and Congress, the American 
public, and the space industry, from the outset. These 
external forces in NASA's environment were convinced of the
5
gains from the space program and thus were able to develop 
routinized relationships with the space agency very rapidly. 
This situation automatically posed to the author several 
very important questions. Why were these external forces so 
convinced of the gains from the space program and, more 
importantly, why was NASA able to achieve such unusual accel­
erated growth during the first part of the last decade? Fin­
ally, why did NASA, after having experienced a period of 
rapid expansion, begin to decline or decelerate in growth 
in 1966?
It is the purpose of this thesis to provide some 
provisional answers to these questions in order to understand 
why NASA's development has deviated from most other patterns 
of bureaucratic growth. In this regard, the author has 
chosen to examine theoretical works on the concept of 
bureau development, and analytically compare NASA's growth 
patterns to these studies.
Anthony Downs, one of the leading authors in this 
field, has provided some interesting insights into the 
growth patterns of most bureaus. In his book. Inside 
Bureaucracy, Downs attributes an organization's growth, 
stability, and decline to a series of external developments, 
internal clianges, or both, which occur during a bureau's 
struggle for autonomy.̂  He describes autonomy as the
^Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Bostoni Littla Brown & Co., 1967) .  — "
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situation In which an agency has undisputed jurisdiction 
over a function, service, goal. Issue, or cause# Autonomy, 
he feels, is crucial In achieving a bureau’s "survival 
threshold," I.e., It Is large enough to render useful 
services, and old enough to have established routinized 
relationships with Its major clients.
Downs discusses a bureau’s growth as generally being 
a constant struggle for survival since there Is always the 
possibility that the bureau will be annihilated or absorbed 
by a much larger bureau. Stability Is achieved when the 
bureau becomes older and has been able to establish rela­
tionships with Its beneficiaries and suppliers. With this 
support a bureau can generally defend Itself against com­
peting elements in Its environment. Decline may become 
prominent If social functions of the bureau do not remain 
Important, or If those social functions are taken over by 
another bureau. Thus, Downs states that major changes in 
growth and decline of a bureau are often caused by exo­
genous, or external, forces In the bureau’s environment. 
Certain environmental forces, he believes, affect a 
bureau’s development more strongly than any purely internal 
changes, although the relationship between external and 
Internal developments tends to have cumulative effects on 
growth or decline.
NASA’s growth and decline, however, provide some 
Intriguing deviations from Downs* description of bureau
7
development. Thus, the author will treat the study of 
NASA's growth dynamics as a special case of Downs* theory- 
The investigation will include a review of the relationships 
between the following variables related to NASA's develop­
ment* international prestige; presidential ideology; and 
other organizations, e.g., the Defense Department (DOD) 
and the aerospace industry. In relation to this last 
variable the study will discuss the potential "predator- 
protector" relationship between DOD and the space industry- 
A discussion of these variables and their connection to 
NASA should provide some interesting insights into the 
reasons behind the space agency's unusual development since 
its creation in 1958.
The method of this study is to review the literature 
on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
in regard to major changes which have occurred within the 
space agency from its creation to the present, with an 
emphasis on discovering their causes. My hypothesis, drawn 
from a theoretical formulation by Downs, is that changes in 
policy, function and internal structure are a consequence of 
environmental forces. This study, however, cannot "test** 
hypotheses in the conventional sense. What I propose to 
do is provide a documented case for the proposition that 
NASA's rapid growth and subsequent decline during the last 
decade was a function of large scale changes in external 
factors. In short, I will be using a simple stimulus-response
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model of organizational changei I will be focusing on the 
relationship between changes in factors external and internal 
to NASA.
External factors are those variables which lie 
outside NASA and may or may not be contingent upon it.
Changes in and among external factors, operating through 
certain organizational constants, produce concomitant 
variation in policy, function, and organizational structure. 
External variables include the behavior of other nations in 
the space field, notably the Soviet Union; the Congress and 
President; the American public ; the space Industry; and 
competing bureaucracies, such as the Department of Defense.
Internal variables are those which Include major 
changes in function, policy, or structure of NASA. Examples 
of internal change are* changes in administration; forma­
tion of new goals ; and changes in methods, such as manned 
space flight as opposed to automated methods of exploration. 
The latter problem of procedures has been of particular 
interest because of the rift in NASA between the scientists, 
who favor fully automated flights, and the engineers, who 
favor manned space flight.
Internal changes will be measured in the number and 
kind of personnel shifts occurring in NASA since its crea­
tion. Number and kind of changes in major policies may also 
be used as an operational indicator to describe the impact 
of external forces. Appropriations of NASA from year to
9
year should likewise give a good indication of the amount 
of support NASA has received from Congress, and thus will 
provide a clue as to when possible changes may have occurred
in the space agency-
The author will try to account for major changes in 
external and internal variables by means of several theoreti­
cal propositions. The format of this thesis will consist 
of a chapter by chapter account of the variables pertaining 
to these theoretical propositions. The first four proposi­
tions will be discussed in Chapter 2 and related to the 
variables of international prestige and presidential ideology- 
The first proposition states that the more the programs of a 
bureau contribute to national prestige, the higher its status 
vis-a-vis other bureaus. In reference to this theoretical 
proposition, this study hopes to demonstrate that because 
NASA's policies were centered around obtaining national 
interests and international prestige, NASA was able to gain 
a higher status, or more recognition from the executive branch 
and Congress vis-a-vis other bureaus.
The first proposition is related to the second and 
third which state, respectively, that the higher the status 
of a bureau, the less it must compete for funds with other 
bureaus, and the less a bureau must compete for funds, the 
faster it grows. Thus, the study will attempt to demonstrate 
that because NASA more or less gained a favorable position 
with governmental officials during its early years of growth.
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It did not have to compete greatly with allocational rivals 
for funds. As a result, it was able to achieve Its rapid 
growth between 1958 and 1966.
The three foregoing propositions are linked with a 
fourth which states that perceptions of presidential roles 
may alter the speed with which a bureau grows, e.g., the 
more conservative the president, the greater the restraint 
on growth. In relation to this proposition the author hopes 
to demonstrate through documented events and policies that 
the philosophy of the president In office, e.g.. Democratic 
or Republican, has had a definite Impact upon NASA’s overall 
growth pattern. Thus are each of these four theoretical 
propositions related to the Important external variables of 
International prestige and presidential Ideology.
In Chapter 3 I will Investigate the role of compet­
ing bureaucracles--namely, the Defense Department, upon NASA’s 
growth. The first of two propositions to be discussed states 
that during periods of growth, agencies reject expansion of 
functions, and during periods of decline, agencies resort 
to Imperialism or logrolling In order to survive. The second 
asserts that In periods of decline, the more an agency log­
rolls, the better Its capacity to defend Its core Interests 
against the bureaucratic Imperialism of former rivals. Con­
cerning these propositions, I hope to demonstrate that NASA 
maintained Its functions and policies as a whole during Its 
period of early rapid expansion %)ut when Its growth began to
11
ebb» the space agency began to shift goals in order to sur­
vive. Thus, this study will attempt to show that because 
NASA was forced to make major shifts in policy it was able 
to withstand impending pressures of its rivals.
The author will also try to show that because NASA had 
a large numberof competitors, e.g., the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force, during its early years of growth, its ability to sur­
vive was enhanced. This was due to the fact that the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force could not coalesce into a unified threat 
to NASA—  "the divide and conquer concept." This situation 
is in relation to the proposition that, the greater the num­
ber of competitors that seek to absorb the central goals of 
another agency, the lower the probability that the agency 
will be destroyed.
Chapter 4 will be devoted to an analysis of the 
aerospace industry as an important variable in the growth 
dynamics of NASA. In this chapter the author will discuss, 
by means of formulating several propositions, the relation­
ship between the aerospace industry and the Defense Depart­
ment as well as NASA. The first proposition asserts that the 
greater the number of competitors seeking to absorb an agen­
cy's goals, the lower the probability that the suppliers and 
beneficiaries of that agency will support it. The second 
states that the stronger a bureau's competitors, the less 
likely the bureau's suppliers and beneficiaries will support 
that bureau. Concerning the applicability of these proposi-
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tlons to NASA’s growth, I will attempt to show that the Army, 
Navy, and the Air Force, as well as,NASA, were competing 
for the aerospace industry’s services, but due to the rela­
tive size and number of these bureaus making up the Defense 
Department complex, the aerospace industries often catered 
to their requests rather than to the civilianspace agency—  
NASA. This situation has led to interesting developments 
between NASA and the Defense Department which will be dis­
cussed in this study, e.g., the relationship between NASA 
and DOD has been steadily increasing since the early sixties.
In the last chapter I will summarize the theory 
behind the space agency’s development in order to restate 
some of the causes behind NASA’s unusual growth pattern. I 
will also reiterate the theoretical propositions set forth 
at the beginning of each chapter and discuss my findings.
In doing so, I hope to make some possible predictions about 
NASA’s growth in the future. In other words, I will be mak­
ing some projections on what I think will happen to NASA 
in future years on the basis of the material gathered for 
the completion of this study.
This study is primarily concerned with the internal 
growth dynamics of one particular U.S. agency— NASA. This 
is not to say that the results of this study may not be 
utilized in analytical comparisons of similar agencies or 
bureaus in our governmental system. Without doubt, then.
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studies of the growth patterns of bureaus such as this will 
greatly enhance the knowledge and understanding of public 
administrators, not to mention political scientists•
The scope of this study primarily entails a span 
of thirteen years, which includes NASA's initial conception 
in 1958 to the present. However, it has proven to be 
expedient in some sections of this study to include events 
occurring just prior to 1958 » The launching of Sputnik I 
in 1957 is probably a good example. It is this single 
event above all others that probably heralded the need for 
the creation of NASA as a civilian space agency.
Material for this paper was gathered from a variety 
of sources. These include Congressional hearings and reports* 
newspapers, periodicals, trade Journal articles* statements 
of those involved in space policy making* publications of 
NASA's Historical Program* other books about the space 
program* and books by or about individuals involved in space 
policy matters. Of all sources, the government documents 
related to NASA were of the greatest value because of their 
informative and voluminous nature.
It may also be mentioned that although the capsule 
fire of Apollo 204, which killed Chaffee, Grissom, and 
White, was probably the greatest tragedy of the space 
program, it nevertheless unfolded a plethora of critical 
analyses on NASA which have been crucial to this study.
Chapter 2
INTERNATIONAL IMPACT UPON NASA'S 
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
In viewing any large scale changes in either the 
growth or decline of NASA we must first look to the Inter­
national setting and the possible Impact that some events 
have had upon United States space policy and NASA's growth. 
The basic premise here Is that the space program since Its 
conception has been largely tied to the national prestige 
and the national Interest of the United States and that 
major policy decisions concerning space are made In regard 
to these two factors. The Issue, as Kennedy saw It, was 
that the national Interest required a large, prestige- 
oriented space program. It Is no coincidence that the goal 
of landing a man on the moon was announced less than a 
month after the abortive Bay of Pigs Invasion, which cost 
the U. S. a good deal of International support.
Paul Seabury conceives the national Interest as 
"a kaleidoscopic process by which forces latent In American 
society seek to express certain political and economic 
aspirations In world politics through the highest organs
14
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of the state."^ National prestige, on the other hand, is 
defined by Vernon Van Dyke asi
• • • consisting of a reputation internationally 
on four qualities* (1) the pursuit of goals that 
are creditable and that respond to the challenge of 
the time* (2) the capacity to achieve the goals*
(3) the necessary determination to achieve them, 
provided it can be done responsibly, i.e., by means 
that do not involve the undue sacrifice of other 
desirable goals * and (4) an assured future, in which 
the other qualities making for prestige will be 
preserved if not enhanced. Deference, as distinguished 
from prestige, can be obtained on the basis of the 
second and third qualities alone, and the proviso 
attached to the third can be dropped.^
"Concerning space policy and national prestige, 
Kennedy’s decision to develop the manned lunar landing and 
return as a national goal was a direct result of his more 
basic decision to reverse the policy that had guided the 
space program during the Eisenhower y e a r s . T h e  lunar 
landing decision for Kennedy was made in international 
political terms, and not with respect to national research 
and development policy as was found in Eisenhower’s later 
years. To Kennedy, the space program was an instrument of
^Paul Seabury, Power, Freedom, and Democracy* The 
Foreign Policy of the United States (New York: Random
House, I963), p. 87.
^Vernon Van Dyke, Pride and Power* The Rationale 
of the Space Program (Urbana, 111.* University of Illinois Press, 190^), pp. 119-120.
^John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Noon* 
Project Apollo and the National Interest {Cambridge* mTT.T Press, 19/'0}, p. 137. -----------------
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American foreign policy, a new means to elevate America's 
global power position. Kennedy made space policy decisions 
In light of the conditions of International politics.
Because of the salience of International politics and 
events with respect to the space program and the development 
of NASA, we should perhaps begin with a review of several 
key historical events and attempt to relate them to NASA's 
growth or decline. NASA's Initial conception has been 
attributed by most authors In the field as a direct response 
to the Russians' first successful launching of Sputnik I 
on October 4, 1957. Sputnik I had a tremendous Impact as 
a historical "first" In space. The feat Itself cannot be 
questioned, but the public and official hysteria that fol­
lowed In the United States was unusual under the circum­
stances. That Is to say. It was unusual only because the 
U. S. had been discussing opening, for the most part, Its 
own plans for a space shot for at least two years prior to 
the launching of the Russian satellite. In fact. Project 
Vanguard was slated to be launched prior to Sputnik but 
was held up by delays Possibly a culmination of many of
^ h e  Russians delivered an official report to the 
headquarters for the International Geophysical Year (IGY) on 
June 10, 1957, declaring the readiness of their satellite 
program. This was four months before Sputnik I was launched. 
They even announced the frequency on which its signals were 
to be transmitted. Meanwhile, Interagency, I.e., Army, Navy 
and Air Force, rivalry and repeated failures to get Vanguard 
off the launch pad worked to slow the U. S. space program. 
Finally, the success of Explorer I was presented as evidence 
that the U. S. was not lagging too far behind the Soviets.
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these factors, reaching a crescendo with the failure of 
Vanguard on the launch pad, placed the U. S. in a very 
dismal position for any exploration of space ahead of the 
Russians•
While the American public grew more uneasy over the 
Russian demonstration of talent, the Congress responded 
with a thorough investigation. In fact, both the Senate 
and the House had separate hearings, with a total of 108 
witnesses, aimed at understanding the problems of space that 
confronted the nation. The Congress, like the general pub­
lic, became quite concerned as to just how far ahead in 
space the Russians really were. In its investigations 
Congress came to the conclusion that the U. S. was about two 
years behind the Russians. The "gap*' was not in scientific 
talent or in the ability to utilize talent but one primarily 
due to a lack of large booster development.
George V. Allen, director of the U. S. Information 
Agency under Eisenhower, also faced a problem in dealing 
with the question of the implications of space efforts 
for national prestige. He told the House Committee on 
Science and Astronautics that the Sputniks had greatly 
enhanced the prestige of the Soviet Union and that American 
prestige had suffered. He said, "All space activities 
are now seen within the framework of the Soviet-American 
competition. Regardless of how Americans may feel about it.
18
5the world sees the U. S. In a space race with the U.S.S.R.** 
In reference to the hearing with Van Allen, a report was 
made stating that the emergence of scientific achievement 
Is of great importance to world prestige and international 
influence. Thus, Congressional investigations at this time 
were very extensive and thorough in order to determine the 
Ü. S.'s position in space in relation to the Soviet Union. 
Actually, there was little cause for alarm at that stage 
of the space race because the United States was not a great 
deal behind the Soviets, although, as previously mentioned, 
they lacked large booster power- Nevertheless, the exag­
gerated responses of the Congress, the press, and the lay 
public produced inevitable results, some of which were clear­
ly beneficial to the formation of a civilian space agency. 
Efforts were made immediately to get the separate space 
activities of various agencies all under one roof, with 
one budget and one broad mission— it was to be labeled 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Eventually, the national interests In space were 
outlined as to their importance, urgency, and inevitably 
in the history-making report of the President's Science 
Advisory Committee (PSAC). Four factors were cited as 
underlying America's space program: man's curiosity; the
^ ' S. Congress, House, Select Committee on Astro­
nautics and Space Exploration, Astronautics and Space 
Exploration, Hearings on H.Res.T188l, 8^th Cong., Ènd Sess., I958I p ^ 512 •
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defense objective (i.e., "peaceful" defense against alien 
space powers)I national prestige; and opportunities to add 
to our scientific knowledge of earth, the solar system, and 
the universe.^ The National Aeronautics and Space Act, 
passed through the efforts of then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson 
and his staff, became law on July 29» 1958. By October 1, 
three days short of the first anniversary of Sputnik I, NASA 
had become firmly established. Thus, a new space agency was 
ushered in following the heavy clamor from Congressmen, the 
press, and vocal citizens over Russia’s successful attempt 
In placing the first unmanned satellite into orbit. It is 
undoubtedly true that NASA’s conception as well as its 
continued growth in its early years was heavily dependent 
on Russia’s activity in space.
The early years of the space age were marked by 
numerous successes of a spectacular nature by the Russians. 
Sputnik I, of course, was spectacular because it was the 
first satellite in space. Sputniks II, III, and IV further 
confirmed Soviet capabilities.7 These successful shots 
were proclaimed by the Soviets as validation of Communist 
preachments and prophecies about the superiority of their
^For discussion of PSAC and its functioning see Robert 
Gilpin and Christopher Wright (eds.), Scientists and National Policy Making (New York* Columbia UnivêfsTtÿ"Press, 1964).
7Vernon Van Dyke discusses other early Soviet shots—  
Cosmic Rockets I, II and III, in Pride and Power, p. 20.
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polltlcal systeni» Naturally» the U # S» was active durlng 
this time and eventually proved Its technical capability In 
space. The U. S. launched thirty-three payloads before 196O 
and Included were some of the notable firsts, e.g., the dis­
covery of the Van Allen Radiation Belts. Nevertheless, the 
failure of Vanguard I on December 6 , 1957 was a deeply morti­
fying response to Sputniks I and II, and by the end of I96O, 
thirty-four additional attempts to launch satellites or es­
cape payloads had failed. A few vehicles were destroyed for 
safety's sake ; some broke up In flight; the second or third 
stage sometimes failed to Ignite or malfunctioned In another 
way; and moon shots failed to reach the moon.
As the number of American launches suggest, the U. S. 
space program achieved considerable magnitude under Elsen­
hower. Total budgets for space rose from 179 million to 
the 1.2 billion that Elsenhower planned for fiscal year 
1961— a sevenfold Increase. Perhaps most Importantly, a 
program for the development of more powerful boosters under 
the direction of V/erhner Von Braun at Huntsville, Alabama 
was Initiated. Therefore, NASA and the space program were 
able to obtain substantial monetary support during the 
Elsenhower years even though the President maintained a 
conservative policy toward space.® He held to this policy
®From Elsenhower's 1955 decisions dealing with 
International Geophysical Year to his I96O disapproval of 
NASA's plans for flights around the moon, "Eisenhower fol­
lowed a rather conservative policy In space." Ibid., p. 22.
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despite repeated challenges to it and to Its premises by 
those in Congress and those in military and civilian life 
who believedt as Eisenhower did not, that the political and 
psychological impacts of space achievements were very im­
portant factors in international politics, factors which, 
as John Kennedy was later to claim, "may hold the key to 
our future*"^ Eisenhower's space program then had a con­
servative and careful aura about it which relinquished 
national prestige for hard scientific data and accomplish­
ments. NASA's administration, especially its director,
Keith T. Glennan, reflected this attitude towards major goals 
in space. As a result, NASA advanced in space, but at a 
very slow rate.
When considering the relationship between external 
and internal factors, one would have to say in light of the 
evidence presented, that external factors, e.g., Russian 
activity in space, were the major impetus in forming NASA 
as well as accounting for most of its growth ; while internal 
factors, such as Eisenhower's perception of the dangers of a 
new power in the military-industrial complex was a source 
of restraint in growth. We will see later in this study that 
even the functions and structure of NASA has been altered by 
these external and internal factors in its environment.
9Ü. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Documents on International Aspects of 
the Exploration and TJs~es of Outer Space, 195411962, BBth 
Cong. 1st Sess., Senate, Document No. ÏÜ, 1963, p. 202.
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NASA was still heavily dependent on interagency co­
operation, especially between the Army, Navy and Air Force. 
It was also, and still is, greatly dependent on the execu­
tive branch of the U. S. Government for policy formulation 
and the legislative branch for appropriations. "Therefore, 
NASA has not achieved what Downs describes as its 'survival 
threshold* and thus does not act as a functionally autono­
mous a g e n c y N A S A ' s  growth has been dependent upon poli­
ticians and engineers to control as they see fit according 
to world events.
After 1961, and the beginning of the Kennedy era, 
NASA took on a new look as a more active and viable agency. 
Shunning the more conservative cloak of the Eisenhower 
Administration and gaining a new emphasis on national pres­
tige and national interest, NASA became more important on 
the international level. Soon after Kennedy took office, 
he recognized that national prestige was an important factor 
in world politics, and thus he soon linked it with spec­
tacular space achievements. He became convinced that space 
achievements were linked closely to the power relationship 
between East and West, and were symbolic manifestations of 
national determination and vitality. Once Kennedy did make 
such a connection, however, he determined that Eisenhower's
^^Survival threshold implies a level of security 
whereby a bureau is large enough to render useful services, 
and old enough to have established and routinized relationships 
with major clients. Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy 
(Boston* Little, Brown, and Company, 196?), p. 9 .
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policy should he modified, and that "we should go to the 
moon." Overall, Soviet space successes had prompted a re- 
evaluation of American education and technologyi they brought 
to the surface many unsolved problems and unsatisfied demands 
in most sections of American society- "Two classified 
surveys of overseas public opinion, prepared by the U. S. 
Information Agency and intended for the use of the executive 
branch, were leaked to the press just ten days before the 
November 8 elections; both showed that U. S- prestige rela­
tive to that of the Soviet Union had declined, during the 
Eisenhower presidency, and that U. S. allies in Europe be­
lieved that the Soviet Union's space successes presaged a 
Communist trend to be predominant military and technological 
power in the world.
The first study reported that "U. S. space successes 
• • • have generated quite limited awareness in Great Britain, 
and while productive of some improvement, still left the U. S. 
far behind the Soviets in space leadership. . . current
French opinion continues to put the U.S.S.R. overwhelmingly
12ahead- . . ." The second report, dated October 10, I960 
was "The World Reaction to the U. S. and Soviet Space Pro­
grams— A Summary Assessment." Polls were taken in Britain, 
France, West Germany, Italy, and Norway and were based on
^^Logsdon, Decision to Go to the Moon, p. 6 5 .
12The New York Times. October 2?, 196O, pp. 28-29.
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reactions to the nations* space programs. The report con­
cluded that "in anticipation of future Ü. S.-U.S.S.R. stand­
ing foreign public opinion. . . appears to have a declining
confidence in the U. S. as the 'wave of the future* in a
l'înumber of critical areas of competition."
Kennedy was noted for responding to this dilemma
by stating that "If the Soviet Union placed the first man
in outer space, it would be the most serious defeat that
the U. S. would suffer in many, many years. . . .  Because
we failed to recognize the impact that being first in outer
space would have the impression that the Soviet Union was
on the march, that it had definite goals, that it knew how
to accomplish them, that it was moving and were standing 
14still." Therefore, although Kennedy in the first few 
months of his administration did not actively involve him­
self in space policy, he was aware of its significance.^^
Action was soon taken to establish a central direc­
tion of the civilian space agency. Activation of the Space
13Washington Post. October 29, i960, p. A.L.
14Van Dyke, Pride and Power, p. 23*
^At the outset of Kennedy's Administration, "he 
seemed to know less and to be less interested in issues of 
space policy than almost any other set of policy questions. 
See Hugh Sidney, John F. Kennedy, President (New York* Athenium Press, 1964), pT 59. -----------
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took place In March of I96I and Vice President Lyndon John­
son, who did much to establish NASA while Majority Leader 
in the Senate, chaired the Council. Functions of the chair­
man and the Space Council were stipulated by Kennedy. Hav­
ing general supervision over NASA, Johnson would receive 
all reports, plans, and policy documents that would ordin­
arily have been sent to the president— although the presi­
dent would approve important decisions. Thus, NASA became 
even more closely tied to the White House, which provided 
it with a competitive advantage superior to most other 
agencies buried in the administrative structure of the 
executive branch. Its stability as a viable governmental 
agency was relatively insured because of the space program* s 
impact on world opinion and because it was coordinated 
through the White House.
Still, the Kennedy task force was highly critical 
of NASA at this time, especially over NASA's proposed pro­
gram for a manned space f l i g h t " T h e  President's Sci­
ence Advisory Committee (PSAC) chaired by Jerome Wiesner, 
called Project Mercury 'marginal* and pointed out that 
because of the U. S. lag in boosters, it was 'very unlikely' 
that the United States would be the first to orbit a man."
The Kennedy task force on space was called the Pres­
ident's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). PSAC was origin­
ally formulated under Eisenhower to review the space program and to recommend changes in space policy.
17. Logsdon, Decision to Go to the Moon, p. 73.
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It was critical of the relative priorities given to manned 
and unmanned flight. One of the failures that the Wiesner 
Committee feared was an attempt to place an American In 
space resulting In the death of an astronaut, or worse yet, 
failure to recover him from orbit. It Is also Important 
to note that at this time, NASA's flight program was charact­
erized by a very high percentage of unsuccessful launches, 
primarily due to unreliable launch vehicles and boosters.
Even Kennedy himself and his staff focused their 
attention on other matters at this time. They had to first 
consider the nation's defense, decisions on new foreign 
policy Initiatives, Issues on preparing legislation leading 
to domestic social welfare programs, and on combating the 
I96O-I961 recession. At this time, Kennedy was also 
deeply Involved with his first crisis, I.e., the decision 
on whether or not the U. S. should Intervene In Laos.^® 
Arthur Schleslnger, one of Kennedy's presidential advisors, 
reported that In the first two months of his administration 
Kennedy spent more time on the Vietnam and Laotian Inter­
ventions than on any other matter.
Kennedy, then, at the outset of his administration, 
had not made up his mind as to what his general attitude 
toward a manned space flight would be. One reason for his
18The pro-American government of Phoumle Nosavan 
seemed near military defeat by the Communist Pathet Lao 
forces, as well as the government of Ngo Dlnh Diem In South Vietnam.
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hesitation to approve the Apollo project was the uncer­
tainty which plagued the success of Project Mercury- Still, 
Kennedy seemed to lean toward the approval of Apollo when 
Influenced by members of the NASA administration, especially 
Earl Webb, Its director, who was personally appointed by 
Kennedy to that position. Webb pointed out that If the 
U. S. did nothing In space while the Soviet Union went on 
from one triumph to another, American prestige would be 
seriously jeopardized. Webb said that#
A tendency exists In some quarters to belittle 
the psychological value of Project Apollo. Think 
. . .  what the reaction would be In this country If 
the Soviets made a successful landing on the moon 
and we had no plans and no potential for getting 
there. Certainly such a situation would be very 
damaging to our position throughout the world. The 
uproar after the first Sputnik would be mild Indeed compared to the storm that would f o l l o w . 19
Kennedy listened Intently to this message. Thus, this type
of argument greatly buttresses the proposition that external
factors such as possible Russian prestige In space greatly
aided NASA's overall growth*
Nevertheless, very few people In Washington In
early I96I expected a new look of the space program to come
as soon as It did. But during the month of April a crisis
period arose which forced space planners and government
^9James E . Webb, "National Goals In the Space Age," 
NASA, Office of Scientific and Technical Information, 
Proceedings of the Conference on Space Age Planning. Mav 6-9, 
Ï963. Chicago, Illinois (Washington, I963), p. 4.
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policy-makers to examine our national goals and space 
programs. Kennedy was informed by his intelligence sources 
early in April that a Soviet flight attempt would soon be 
made. "On the evening of April 11th Kennedy was told by 
Jerome Wiesner that the Soviet flight would probably occur 
during the night
Wiesner was correct. A dispatch from Moscow 
announced*
The world’s first space ship Vostok with a man 
on board, has been launched on April 12 in the Soviet 
Union on a round-the-earth orbit. The first space 
navigator is Soviet citizen pilot Major Yuri 
Alekseyevich Gagarin.
Krushchev, who was quick to take advantage of such 
an opportunity, snapped, "Let the capitalist countries 
catch up with our country!" Adding further to the response. 
East German leader Ulbricht added that the flight "demon­
strates to the whole world that socialism must triumph 
over the decaying system of yesterday." Propaganda 
emerging from the Soviet block stressed several themes*
(1) the Gagarin flight was evidence of the virtues of 
"victorious socialism," (2) the flight was evidence of the 
global superiority of the Soviet Union in all aspects of 
science and technology.
^^Sidney, Kennedy, President, p. 111.
21Lloyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and 
Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean* A History of Project 
Mercury (Washington, dT“cT* NASA, 1966), p. 332.
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On an international level many countries were 
unanimous in praise and exhaltation for the Russians* great 
achievement. Great Britain heralded universal praise for 
the Soviets in their achievement. France*s news media was 
filled with accolades to the Soviet*s space spectacular- 
And in Italy, the Vatican called the voyage "a universal 
good."
In America, the event cost the nation heavily in 
prestige and marred the political and psychological image 
of the United States abroad. It was then that Robinson 
and Snyder considered our manned program for a lunar Isuiding 
to have been made in crisis situation. Snyder and 
Robinson feel that certain criteria are needed for distin­
guishing whether a situation is crisis-like or not.
These criteria are:
"(1) The extent of anticipation and prior programming.
(2) The ratio of time available for making a decision 
to the demands of the task.
(3) The scope and domain of the values at stake.
They characterize decisions that arise without
prior planning, allow short time for response, and have high 
value consequences as most crisis-like decisions. Using
James Robinson and Richard Snyder, "Decision 
Making in International Politics," International Behavior: 
A Social-psychological Analysis, edl Hubert Kelman (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, I965), pp. 440-442.
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these criteria, the decision to strengthen NASA and develop 
a lunar landing program was very clearly crlsls-llke. This 
Is Important to note because, although the lunar landing 
program had been discussed for several years. It still had 
not received due attention until a state of high urgency 
arose. I.e., Gagarin* s orbital flight.
The situation stood with the world believing that 
the Soviet Union was the most scientifically and techno­
logically competent nation In the world. Jerome Wiesner 
stated that "We are paying a price In all kinds of ways—  
Internationally, politically"— and that was the Issue that 
the president was dealing with.
The most vocal responses came from Congress.
Hearings, especially In the lower House, were conducted 
In an atmosphere of panic, fear, and almost hysteria over 
the Soviet's success In space. Republican James Fulton, 
speaking to Webb and Dryden during a session of the House 
Committee on Science and Aeronautics, said, "I believe we 
are In a race, and I have said many times, Mr- Webb, 'Tell 
me how much money you need and this Committee will authorize 
all you needî'"^3
Another statement by Representative King (Rep., N.Y.) 
probably best reflects the Congressional mood toward a
3u. S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Discussion of Soviet Man In Space Shot, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., iy6i, p. 7 . ' "
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greater buildup of the space program and NASA. He statesi
I would like to suggest that we are in a specific 
race with the Russians. Who will get to the moon 
first? In our race for the exploration of space 
there are three major breakthroughs or dramatic 
successes. . . The first satellite, the first man 
in space, and the first man to the moon and back.
The score is two to nothing, in favor of the 
Russians. We still have the third prize to obtain.
I think the third is probably worth more than the 
first two together. So we are still in the race
Kennedy was well aware of both the public and 
Congressional support for the space program. He also knew 
that this support would enhance his position as President 
because he had already experienced heavy frustration in 
obtaining passage of his previous programs. He soon 
accepted the space program as being his own.
The impact of the Soviet challenge In the Gagarin 
flight greatly enhanced NASA's position as a governmental 
agency. It experienced rapid growth during this time with 
its expanded budget.
Another international event, and thus external 
factor, which aided NASA's growth at this time was the 
failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. This failure on the 
part of the Kennedy Administration left a large vacuum in 
foreign policy and national prestige which was to be 
filled temporarily by the United States' success in space.
. S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and 
Astronautics, 1962 NASA Authorization, Hearings on H. R. 
3238 and H. R. 6o29, b?th Cong., 1st Sess.. Part"2. 196^. p. B2b .
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The fiasco of the Bay of Pigs reinforced Kennedy's 
determination to approve a program aimed at placing the 
United States ahead of the Soviet Union in the competition 
for firsts in space. It was one of the many pressures that 
converged on the president at the time, and thus its exact 
influence cannot be isolated. As president, Kennedy could 
treat few issues in isolation, and there seems to be little 
doubt that the Bay of Pigs was in the foremost of his 
thoughts as he called Lyndon Johnson to his office on 
April 19 and asked him to find a space program which 
promises dramatic results in which we could w i n S u c h  
external pressures contributed greatly to HASA's prestige 
among U. S. priorities. Actual growth at this time was 
evidenced by additional funding by Congress for both 
Gemini and Apollo programs. Larger boosters were being 
developed and centers around the country were expanding.
On May 5» 19^1, Alan Shepard made his successful 
suborbital flight which brought a wave of national relief 
and pride over the U. S. Later Kennedy announced his 
intention to accelerate the space program and that he 
planned to undertake a substantially larger effort in
^ ^ h e  Bay of Pigs invasion consisted of a group of 
Cuban exiles, trained and financed by the CIA, who attempted 
to invade Cuba and overthrow the Castro regime. The 
invasion began on April 15, 1961 and on April 19 it was 
declared a total failure.
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space. It was later reported that Kennedy planned to 
add $600 million to the civilian and military space 
budget.
The NASA budget was Increased by $5^9 million for 
the Fiscal Year 1962, which was coupled with a $126 million 
March Increase. This represented a 6l percent Increase 
In the NASA budget over the Elsenhower figure of $1.1 
billion. The Department of Defense was given $62 million 
for work on solld-fuel boosters.
Kennedy* s recommendations for setting a lunar 
landing as a national goal found Immediate and almost 
unanimous support not only In Congress but also across 
the nation. In only eight months between September I96O 
and May I96I the status of manned space flight had reached 
a new high in United States priorities. It seemed to have 
an unlimited future.
With the support of Congress, the President, and 
the nation as a whole, NASA soon began to move at an 
accelerated pace. NASA then, experienced rapid growth 
as a bureau In both Its size and the relative social 
significance of Its functions. This occurred, as previously 
cited. In response to external environmental conditions 
favorable to the expansion of the bureau* s functions.
James Webb, NASA Press Release, May 25» I961.
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I.e., development of scientific and technological knowledge 
about space with a subtle emphasis on winning the race to 
the moon ever the Soviet Union.
This accelerated expansion seen through the early 
Sixties was perhaps highlighted by John Glenn's first 
American orbital flight in February, 1962. The flight 
inspired feelings of tremendous pride and quiet jubilation. 
It was a monumental achievement of which America was 
certainly proud, and it revived a feeling of pride and 
self-confidence.
Such a successful flight is said by many authors 
to have placed far too much confidence in America's 
technical capacity in space. With the national prestige 
high, and the national morale restored, a concern for 
prestige and pride lost some of its force as a motive for 
a space program. The growth acceleration soon ran into 
obstacles. Anthony Downs best describes NASA's rising 
difficulties as "trying to produce impressive results as 
its organization grew larger and more unwieldy." Continuing, 
he states that, "a bureau cannot generate external support 
(except among its suppliers) without producing services 
beneficial to someone outside its own members. Therefore, 
a bureau must periodically come up with impressive results 
if it wishes to sustain its growth."^7 NASA's staging of
^^Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 12.
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dramatic events over well-spaced intervals best illustrates 
this concept. As it has grown larger and taken on more 
functions, it has become increasingly difficult to produce 
convincing results. An example of a new function was the 
development of a manned lunar program which had limited 
scientific and military implications. The commitment to a 
lunar landing has constituted a policy of impressive results 
that took too long to achieve.
Downs also states that "as the accelerating bureau 
grows larger, it encounters more and more resistance to 
further relative growth of its functions at the expense of
opother activities of society." Senator Pulbright best 
described the changing mood by sayingi "Are there not other 
factors Involved in our prestige and self-esteem, such as 
our capacity to employ and educate, to house and transport 
our own people?"
The change began to show in Congress in the spring of 
1962 following John Glenn's orbital flight. Many Congress­
men began favoring cooperation with Russia in space or at 
least they lessened their desire in some form to beat the 
Russians. This resulted in doubt about the justifiability 
of the entire program, particularly the projected manned 
lunar landing. For the most part, the shift in attitudes
®̂Ibid.
29J. William Pulbright, "The American Agenda," Satur- day Review (July 20, 1963), p. 15. -----
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was due to Increasing awareness ofthe Influence of pride and 
to a genuine belief that the desire to bolster it through 
a lunar landing did not justify the great expenses involved.
Such a shift of attitudes has also led to internal 
dissension in the organization itself. This dissension 
has developed mainly between the engineers and the scientists, 
causing a structural and functional rift in NASA.
The problem exists because, traditionally, NASA has 
put technology before science. "This approach led to the 
resignation of three of the elite handful of scientists—  
astronauts, and the departure of several top scientists from 
the Apollo program as well as angry mutterlngs from the aca­
demic community that space officials were slighting science 
The rift between scientists and engineers was perhaps strong­
est during the Mercury flights in I96I and I962 and over the 
years the struggle produced constant tension and shaky com­
promises. Recently, scientists have been urging NASA to 
devote its energies to a sustained series of flights seeking 
greater knowledge of the moon's origin and evolution. But 
most engineers are still eager to build bigger spacecraft 
and better rockets and push on to other planets. The sci­
entists became greatly disappointed over the âiift in goals 
of NASA during Kennedy's Administration. Previously, the 
Eisenhower Administration had stressed the peaceful purposes
30Johnathan Spivak, "Rift in NASA: Scientists Make
Gains in Clash with Engineers over U. S. Space Goals," Wall 
Street Journal, November l4, 1969, p. l.
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In space to avoid the appearance of* militarism, and thus 
stressed the scientific aspect of the program.
While Kennedy and Johnson were In office, however, 
the space effort was aimed more at the glamorous and specta­
cular aspect of a manned lunar flight, rather than the sci­
entific nature of the program. Commenting further on the 
science/engineering rift. Dr. H. H. Hess, once chairman of 
the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences, 
asserted that "the lunar program does not have the enthusi­
astic support of many scientists" and explained that It was 
"primarily an engineering, technological, and biomedical pro­
ject , not a basic scientific e f f o r t M a n y  scientists 
were worried that a man-In-space program would cost more 
than the scientific returns would Justify. They felt that 
the same returns and more could be gathered by fully auto­
mated unmanned space probes•
Some scientists* protests and private pressures 
finally began to have an effect on NASA's priorities. More 
scientists have been and are now being trained as astro­
nauts for future lunar flights. In fact, moon shots have 
been Interspersed as to allow the development of technical 
Instruments which will take years to produce. Therefore, 
Internal developments between the scientists and the engin­
eers have brought about a réévaluation of the goals of the
^^Van Dyke, Pride and Power, p. 95.
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space program as well as a change of procedure, such as 
stress on automated flights and broader scientific coverage* 
Also, more scientists over the years have been phased Into 
administrative positions and thus have realigned some of 
NASA's operations.
The main Impetus which formulated this réévaluation 
of the space program to Its original goals has been the 
slackening of Russian activity In space (although within 
the last year the Soviets have become more active In the 
development of the orbiting space station, Salyute) • It Is 
this period of "external slack" which has allowed the Presi­
dent , Congress, and the American people to reevaluate the 
Importance of landing a man on the moon. Because of the 
prior outbacks and major slowdown of NASA, Its functions 
again began to compete allocatlonally with other programs 
for social attention and resources.
People then, may not become aware of a value until 
a threat to It develops; and If the threat recedes, concern 
for the value may recede. This can be clearly seen In 
reference to NASA's growth dynamics. It took the external. 
International factors of Sputnik and Gagarin's flight to 
awaken the American people and Congress to some precious 
values— especially to the Importance of pride; and with the 
restoration of pride, ccncem for It diminished.
NASA then had an unprecedented rate of growth In 
the early Sixties, which seemed to be In response to external
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factors or events In its environment. The lack of those 
same factors caused a leveling and finally a tapering effect 
upon NASA in recent years, especially since 1967. With the 
lack of an external threat, internal factors became im­
portant» i.e., scientist and engineer rifts, as well as a 
questioning of the basic goals and functions in relation 
to other competing elements in society. Clearly, NASA is 
in deep trouble as an agency of the government if its 
social functions do not expand. This situation will be de­
pendent upon other external or exogenous factors in its 
environment other than Russian activity in space. These other 
factors are primarily NASA's supporters and beneficiaries, 
industry and the Department of Defense. Because of the 
importance of these two elements, we have devoted the next 
two chapters to an analysis of their relationship with NASA 
and how they have affected NASA's growth as a governmental 
agency.
Chapter 3 
NASA AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Having considered the ways in which international 
factors have provided a major impetus for the overall de­
velopment and growth of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, we should now turn to another important 
external factor which has greatly affected NASA’s growth 
dynamics, the Department of Defense (DOD).
Most bureaus or agencies have functional and alloca- 
tional rivals in at least one area, and NASA is no excep­
tion. As one of the newer bureaus of the late Fifties, NASA 
was especially vulnerable because its initial external sources 
of support were generally weak, or at least were not routin- 
ized into a relationship with the space agency. Perhaps 
the basic problem was a lack of organizational autonomy 
because of its dependence not only upon the executive branch 
for direction and the Congress for appropriation, but also 
upon the DOD, because the Army controlled booster power, 
the Air Force launched the missions, and the Navy directed 
important research and rescue functions for the space pro­
gram. In its formative years, NASA lacked the relative 
autonomy needed for control of in-house activities. Auton­
omy gives an organization a stable claim to resources and 
places it in a favorable position to compete with other
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groups for those resources * Lack of autonomy was a major 
factor retarding NASA's growth prior to Sputnik because it 
was under constant threat of being absorbed by its much 
larger functional and allocational rival, the DOD.
The question of military versus a civilian space 
agency dates back to the Eisenhower Administration. In 
April 1955» President Eisenhower approved plans for launch­
ing an American satellite ; he designated that the earth 
satellite program be separated from, and not interfere 
with, DOD work on long range ballistic missiles. The separ­
ation of the satellite mission from the development of 
military hardware meant that the satellite program was to 
be conducted for scientific purposes only.
This policy was somewhat altered upon the success­
ful launching of Sputnik I by the Soviet Union in 1957. 
Nevertheless, Eisenhower remained fairly firm in his inten­
tion to make the space program a civilian and scientific 
effort rather than a military campaign. Eisenhower's 
stand on the issue of placing the military in a secondary 
role in space can best be seen in the following statement*
If the project is designed solely for scientific, 
purposes, its size and its cost must be tailored to the 
scientific job it is going to do. . . •— If the project 
has some ultimate defense value, its urgency for this 
purpose is to be judged in comparison with the probable value of competing projects
U . S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Astronautleal 
and Space Sciences, Documents on International Aspects of the
Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, 1954-1962. BBth Cong..--1st Sess., 1963, S. Doc. lb, pp. 3d, ^1.
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One of Elsenhower's most important reactions to Sput­
nik I was to grant American scientists increased access to 
the highest echelons of national policy making. In the 
several weeks following the launch of the Soviet satellite, 
more scientists met with the President than had done so in 
the previous ten months. The President's Science Advisory 
Committee (PSAC) moved from a limited and low-level position 
in the Office of Defense Mobilization to the White House. 
PSAC was given the full responsibility for laying out in 
more detail the goals of the national space program. It 
listed four important goals of the program as % "(1 ) full-
fill the compelling urge of man to explore and to discover;
(2) the defense objective ; (3) the factor of national pres­
tige ; (4) provide new opportunities for scientific observa-
2tion and experiment.” PSAC thus revealed the need to 
establish a civilian-oriented space agency, rather than one 
under military management. The Committee felt that it would 
not be in the best national interest to exploit space sci­
ence at the cost of weakening U . S . efforts in other sci­
entific endeavors « Probably the most lasting effect of 
the Eisenhower space policy was his insistance on separat­
ing civilian and military space efforts and on giving the 
primary emphasis to civilian efforts. The decision to 
establish NASA, the civilian space agency, was a direct
^Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright (eds.), Sci­entific and National Policy Making (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1964).
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result of that policy.
Out of the Eisenhower Administration emerged a 
coordinated space program. Nevertheless, supporters of 
the program could not agree on the specific features of 
the program. Rivalry between the Armed Services, espec­
ially the Army and Air Force as well as NASA, aided in 
fragmenting the program. Even the National Space Council, 
whose purpose was to help coordinate these elements and 
set policy directions, had little support from the Presi­
dent. In fact, Eisenhower received support from the House 
to abolish the Council. This move, however, was later 
aborted by Lyndon Johnson, then Senate Majority Leader, 
who felt that the Council would be important in the future. 
Rivalry among the Armed Forces and with NASA for control 
over the space program was perhaps greatest in relation 
to the manned space program. Against this background of 
disequilibrium in the space policy-making process, several 
decisions emerged which greatly affected NASA's overall 
growth* first, the assignment of responsibility for manned 
space flight programs to NASA in mid-1958 and second, the 
transfer of the Saturn booster program from the Army 
Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) to NASA.
NASA was now competing heavily with a much larger 
and stronger functional rival, the Air Force. The Air 
Force had long planned a program for a manned space flight 
with an initial objective of achieving satellite flight
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as soon as possible. In fact, the Air Force had competed 
heavily with NASA's predecessor, the National Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics ( N A C A ) B y  mid-1958, the 
President assigned the responsibility for the nation's 
first manned space program to NASA.
The Air Force, or at least its space-oriented 
division, never completely reconciled itself to this 
decision. All through 1959» and 1960, the Air Force 
continued to campaign for a military flight program.
The Air Force campaign continued throughout the Sixties 
and still provides a major threat to NASA today.
The second major decision was the transfer of the 
Army Ballistic Missile Agency's (ABMA) Von Braun team to 
NASA. Dr. Wemher Von Braun and his associates were 
developing large boosters required to launch much heavier 
satellites. Problems arose in developing the large 
boosters (Saturn series) and the program was transferred 
to the Air Force. This decision was followed by months 
of Army-Air Force conflict, and left the Aimy with a 
space booster team but no mission for its use. The Air 
Force, of course, insisted that the Von Bratan team also 
be transferred to them, but the ABMA opposed the Air 
Force request. Because of this opposition between Army
% h e  Air Force, and especially the Ballistic Missile 
Division of the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC), 
had been interested in developing an Air Force manned space flight capability since 1956.
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and Air Force, the Army finally supported a transfer of 
the team to NASA. NASA now had the manned space flight 
mission, the spacecraft, and the booster experts to carry 
out its mission. Plans for a full-fledged moon program 
were finally to be realized, and as a result, NASA grew 
by enormous strides. It was shortly after this time 
that NASA began to achieve support from President Kennedy 
as well as increased support from Congress. This unpre­
cedented support enabled the civilian space agency to 
withstand the many pressures placed upon it by its military 
competitors. Even the nation’s communications media were 
stressing the manned flight program of NASA. This emphasis 
seemed to strike a responsive note with the American 
people, indicating at least a latent support for future 
manned flights.
The rivalry between the Army and the Air Force 
provided a divided opposition which favored NASA because 
both the Army and the Air Force preferred to give con­
cessions to NASA rather than to each other. This type of 
external stimulus greatly aided NASA’s growth and its 
stability in later years.
These early concessions have helped draw the 
defense system closer to NASA. "Air Force planners now 
agree that they can benefit from NASA’s work and they and 
the civilian agency are establishing more joint committees 
and lines of liaison to assure that each benefits from the
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other's progress»**^ As a result, a positive relationship 
between NASA and the Department of Defense (DOD) has been 
steadily increasing since the early Sixties. "The trend 
has accelerated partly due to the fact that both the 
Congress and the Executive Branch have seemingly favored 
spending money on anti-poverty programs or *hard* defense 
goals It has been important for NASA to maintain the
guise of a peaceful space agency in order to gain and 
maintain public support for all space projects and yet give 
the DOD space efforts an effective "cover."
This improved relationship between NASA and the DOD 
has been an important underlying factor in NASA's stability 
and growth dynamics. Such a union has provided general 
support from the powerful defense-oriented bloc within 
Congress. This Congressional bloc had normally defeated 
major appropriations bills to NASA as a civilian agency.
It is for this reason that NASA administrators have taken 
full advantage of major defense spin-offs that have acorued 
from NASA's technical capabilities. "NASA is careful.
Editors of Fortune, The Space Industry* America's Newest Giant (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.* Prentice Hall,T96ZTT"-pr33.
friend A. Kennan and Edmund H. Harvey, Mission to the Moon* A Critical Examination of NASA and the Space 
Program (New York* William Morrow & Co., 196^),'p'. 2l6.
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however, In not overdoing the defense tie-up because it 
must not only maintain a cover up for some defense projects 
but it must also protect itself from being too fully 
absorbed into the defense department or be abolished all 
together."^
In reviewing the NASA-DOD relationship it is evident 
that it began during the late Fifties. At this time NASA 
relied heavily upon the Army for its booster power as 
well as upon the Air Force for mission control. Continuing 
into the Sixties, the Defense Department gained a strong 
hold in the field of space. Appropriations for military 
space activities were larger than appropriations for NASA 
until the Apollo program was initiated. The most obvious 
and least controversial military applications of space 
technology are now found generally in the areas of 
communication, navigation, meteorology, and geodesy, where 
a considerable amount of non-military applications overlap.
One of the earlier military efforts to balance the 
Soviet space threat was a project called ^Samos.” “Samos," 
as a reconnaissance satellite, was used to replace the 
former U-2 planes. Its cameras and other devices provided 
intelligence concerning the precise location of Soviet 
missile launching sites. Another program, unofficially
^Ibid. Kennan and Harvey report that approximately 
75 percent of NASA's Space Vehicle Division effort, while 
aimed at NASA objectives, is of direct benefit to DOD.
48
called "Ferret," provided satellites that could Intercept 
radio, radar, and microwave telephone transmissions In the 
Soviet Union. Still another military satellite was nick­
named "Midas," which was originally equipped with Infra­
red sensors to detect enemy missile launchings. This 
satellite, however, proved unsuccessful after the military 
discovered that the satellite's Infra-red devices could 
readily be tripped by heat from large Industrial furnaces 
In the Soviet Union.
These military adventures are listed here only to 
demonstrate how DOD activity In space overlapped with 
that of NASA. An example of a logrolling strategy was the 
close relationship between the Apollo Applications Program 
(AAP) of NASA and the Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL) of 
the Air Force. The Apollo Applications Program (AAP) 
was a series of shots designed to make use of leftover 
Apollo hardware after the moon landing had been accomplished. 
Its purpose was to conduct long-duratlon space flights and 
to perform scientific Investigations In earth orbit. The 
Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL) of the military was very 
similar except that maneuvers would be of a defense nature 
and highly secretive. Many governmental officials felt 
that both programs led to duplication. NASA defended AAP 
and MOL by stating that the programs were not directly 
related and that NASA was cooperating with the MOL project.
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The Bepubllcan Platform and Richard Nixon in I968 
deplored the lack of emphasis on the military use of space 
for America’s defense. Now Nixon’s Administration has 
tended to favor financial cuts in the civilian space 
program. Consequently, the military has succeeded in 
gaining stature with Washington at NASA’s expense. This 
can be clearly seen in the major slowdown that both 
NASA and the aerospace industry have been experiencing 
over the last five years. With NASA’s famous shot to 
the moon completed and its slowdown continuing, it has 
sought closer ties with its larger competitor— the Depart­
ment of Defense (DOD).
Richard Lyons of the New York Times, in an October, 
1968 issue, wrote that*
NASA, which was once reluctant about associating 
itself with the military uses of space, now appears 
more relaxed. In order to sell the space agency to 
Congress and the taxpayers, NASA officials now adopt 
the line that military objectives are among the 
beneficial •’spinoffs” from the 43-billion ^ p e n t  
through 19687 national space program.
Much of NASA’s defense work is based upon a clause 
in the 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act (amended 
in 1962), which directs NASA to make discoveries available 
to agencies directly concerned with national defense.
The Act also enables the military to provide NASA with 
information which is of value to that agency.
Some of the areas in which NASA has been working 
closely with DOD are cited in the following paragraphs.
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"DOD technology requirements and research activities 
are tcJcen into account in the formulation of practically all 
of NASA’s research and technology p r o g r a m s S e v e n t y -  
five percent of NASA’s Space Vehicle Division effort, 
while aimed at NASA objectives, is of direct benefit to 
DOD, NAwA boasts of its 5t6ll man-hours in testing a 
Titan rocket model, 2,900 man-hours conducting wind 
tunnel tests on Titan 3» and 13,000 more man-hours testing 
a one-fifth size scale model of the Titan 3, all for the 
Air Force.
NASA is also gaining a larger share of research 
concerned with the Vietnam War. "The Space Agencies Office 
of Advanced Research and Technology has spent between 4 
million and 5 million dollars a year directing the efforts 
of 100 scientists and engineers on tasks vital to the 
Vietnam War."® One of NASA’s "limited warfare" teams has 
been developing a super-quiet aircraft engine that will 
enable aircraft to drop their payloads before the enemy 
is aware of their presence.
The House Subcommittee on NASA Oversight stated 
that NASA could loft a syncronous satellite over southeast
^Ibid., p. 207. 
®Ibid., p. 208.
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Asia. The satellite would be equipped with a huge 
mirror designed to reflect the sun's rays for twenty-four 
hours daily, thus providing light for the darkened Jungles. 
Finally, the project was abandoned due to protests from 
civilian astronomers and naturalists.
NASA has always worked closely with DOD, but has 
acknowledged its close relationship only recently. One 
aspect of the relationship between NASA and DOD is the 
"old soldiers and sailors" clause in the NASA Act of 1958*
This clause authorizes (but does not require) the adminis­
tration to employ retired commissioned officers of the 
Armed Forces of the United States. This clause has 
resulted in NASA's becoming heavily manned with admirals 
and generals, as well as with engineers of which the Armed 
Forces has a large supply. For example, "at the end of 
1967, there were 323 military personnel 'on detail' to 
NASA. These included I89 from the Air Force, 99 from the 
Army, 32 from the Navy and three from the Marine Corps. " ̂  
Engineers compose the largest segment of the NASA operations 
and many of these engineers are retired commissioned officers 
from the service. Engineers, especially at the administrative 
level, have been responsible for the technology development 
of NASA's Apollo moon project. This has caused a personnel
9ibid., p. 215.
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imbalance which has resulted in a "lump" effect in the 
organization"s manpower structure. Such an abundance 
of retired military personnel and engineers in administrative 
positions has aroused an outcry from the deprived scientists 
in the program. The scientists have felt the pressure in 
the engineer-oriented moon program. This has led to 
internal dissension and goal realignment in future programs. 
The likelihood that the scientists will become as impor­
tant as the military or the engineers in future NASA 
space programs is doubtful.
It is concluded that not only is NASA's program 
more or less defense-oriented, but there has always 
existed, concealed from public scrutiny, a vigorous Defense 
Department space program. NASA is not the only agency 
whose functions relate to the space effort, and thus 
NASA has been experiencing more and more pressure from 
its stronger and larger competitor— the DOD.
NASA has realized its dilemma and has tried to 
shift many of its peaceful functions in space explorations 
to more defense-oriented programs in order to gain 
Congressional and Executive support. Anthony Downs in 
his book Inside Bureaucracy refers to this procedure.
He states that "bureaus are often willing to shift 
functions in order to survive; hence the relative decline 
of their initial social functions will not kill them if
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they are agile enough to undertake new and more viable 
functions before it is too l a t e S t a r b u c k  elaborates 
on this by stating that "as a bureau ages, its officials 
become more willing to modify the bureau's original formal 
goals in order to further the survival and growth of Its 
administrative machinery."
NASA, however, in its attempt to remain a viable 
agency, may have gone too far by adopting defense measures 
in its programs. Originally NASA was to be a civilian 
agency working in the scientific aspect of peace. Now the 
bureau's original goals are being modified to include 
national security and national prestige. The danger in 
modifying such goals is that NASA's functions may be a 
duplication of the DOD's work in space. Under such a 
situation, NASA is in danger of being absorbed by its much 
larger functional rival. The tragedy is that the "civilian" 
space agency is slowly being whittled away, while the 
space portion of the DOD is obtaining funds taken from 
NASA. Figure 2 illustrates how DOD's space spending has 
risen every year since 1966, while NASA's budget has
^^Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston* Little. Brown & Co., 196?), p. 2^1 "
^^William H. Starbuck, "Organization Growth and 
Development," Handbook of Organizations, ed. J. G. March (ChicagoI Rand McNalley, 196 4̂-) .
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steadily fallen.
Summarily, NASA, during its earlier years of growth, 
received overwhelming support as a civilian agency accom­
plishing scientific results with a secondary emphasis on 
defense in space. Now, the space agency is being pressured 
by the Department of Defense and hawkish governmental 
elements to re-evaluate its original goals and to modify 
many of its former functions. A lack of any large measure 
of space activity until just recently, plus the increased 
pressure from the Department of Defense (another external 
element), has produced some large scale changes in NASA's 
growth. Acting as a catalyst, the recessive nature of the 
national economy over the past few years has aided the 
tapering and slowing down of NASA* s development as a civi­
lian agency.
John Noble Wilford best described NASA's situation 
in an article in a mid-April, I968 issue of the New York 
Times when he said, "After a heady decade of uninterrupted 
hiring, building and dreaming great dreams of far-reaching 
exploration, the American /civilian7 space program is 
gearing down to a slower pace and a less certain future." 
Perhaps NASA's only means of survival, or at least autonomy, 
lies with its suppliers or beneficiaries. Downs states 
that "If a bureau's suppliers (industry) or beneficiaries
^^John Noble Wilford, The New York Times, April I6 ,1968.
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are strong and well organized in comparison to its rivals, 
then it will probably quickly gain a clearly autonomous 
position."^3 With this in mind, this study will review in 
the next chapter the space industry's role In the formulation 
and continuation of NASA's growth.
The outlook for NASA is questionable for the 
remainder of the Seventies. Space industry and other NASA 
supporters are becoming fewer and thus will not be able 
to bring the space agency back to its former status. NASA's 
competitor (DOD) is encroaching more and more upon the 
civilian space agency. Even the press, aerospace industry, 
and the Pentagon have provided a clear indication that 
defense spending in space will probably soar in the Seven­
ties. The loser will be NASA, as well as its supporters 
who have dreamed about future peaceful explorations of 
space.
-'Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 10.
Chapter 4
THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRYi A KEY 
TO NASA'S DEVELOPMENT
Having previously discussed the role of increased 
military activity in space, as well as the impact of 
international events upon NASA's overall growth, a word 
should be said about a third external factor greatly 
affecting NASA's development— the aerospace industry. The 
aerospace industry is particularly important because, as 
both a supplier and a beneficiary, this industry holds 
the key to NASA's future growth and development, as well 
as to its autonomy as a functioning bureau*
In viewing the aerospace industry in an overall 
perspective, it is one of the largest and most powerful 
segments of the industrial world. Its position in 
America's future is best cited by Karl C. Harr, Jr., 
president of the Aerospace Industries Association. Accord­
ing to Kennan and Harvey, Harr said:
This industry almost alone is the possessor of 
of the advanced technology on which the future well 
being of the nation depends. This is true not 
only in terms of military security, but also applies 
to the myriad of other accomplishments that will 
determine the prestige, power, and economic status
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of the United States in the world of tomorrow.^
Its vastness can best be seen by reviewing lists of numerons 
aerospace corporations, large and small- These various 
companies, such as North American Rockwell (North American 
Aviation prior to I967). McDonnell, Boeing, Martin- 
Marietta, etc., and their subdivisions, propose, design, 
and develop launch systems, space craft, satellites and 
other technical equipment that NASA utilizes in conducting 
its exploration of space.
The aerospace industry* s political power can be 
shown by its ability to tie one state, such as California, 
closer to federal control. Dr. James L. Clayton, Assistant 
Professor of History at the University of Utah, maintained 
that, "wages and salaries paid to aerospace employees in 
California, since World Warr II, had exceeded all state and 
local public welfare expenditures throughout the entire 
nation."2 For the period between 1951 and I965, "$6?.2 
billion, or about 20 percent of all DOD prime defense 
contracts for suppliers, services, and construction, were 
received in that one state. An additional 5.3 billion was
^Erland A. Kennan and Edmund H. Harvey, Mission to 
the Moon* A Critical Examination of NASA and the Space 
Program (New York* William Morrow, 1969) , pp% 237-":
^Ibid., p. 241.
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spent there by NASA, from 196I through 1965* This amounted 
to about 41 percent of NASA*s.total spending during those 
y e a r s . T h i s  is indicative of the impact of the aerospace 
industry upon the U. S. economy and especially upon the 
State of California. Many authors relate that this depen­
dence of whole sectors of the economy on government contracts 
has more or less changed the relationship of government to 
business. This has been particularly true in the case of 
the aerospace industry.^
The aerospace industry has increased its scope 
because of the Vietnam War and the space program over the 
last decade. In the early Sixties the aerospace industry 
was referred to as an infant industry which was expected 
to become one of the industrial giants of America. Forbes 
magazine in I962 predicted that government expenditures 
on space would increase from its then $11.6 billion mark
3lbid.
^ h e  aerospace industry was in the process of de­
veloping the Super Sonic Transport (SST) when Congress 
stopped further funding of the project. The program was to 
fill the gap left in the wake of the Apollo Project as well 
as being a response to the Soviet’s prototype of the SST 
and the Anglo-French Concorde. With no funding in sight 
for the SST program the aerospace industry has had to lay 
off thousands of workers, engineers, and scientists. This 
drastic set-back culminated with NASA's slow-down, which 
has contributed heavily to the temporary recession and 
spiraling unemployment rates across the nation.
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to In excess of 20 billion annually by 1970. Although the 
growth level has not been that spectacular» the Industry has 
still shown Impressive gains. Gerson Chanowltz, chief 
economist for the Aerospace Industries Association, wrote 
in Aviation Week, July 8, 1968t "The aerospace Industry 
Is the largest manufacturing employer In the U. S., with 
well over 1.4 million people. One In 50 people employed 
In the nation works for the aerospace Industry."
NASA's growth and development has not been as 
spectacular as that of the aerospace Industry. NASA 
provides only about 30 percent of the business and Income 
that has gone to the thriving aerospace Industries. The 
other major client Is the Department of Defense (DOD) ,
NASA's functional and allocatlonal rival In space.
The aerospace Industry devotes two-thirds of Its 
effort to the military sector and the remaining one-third 
to NASA. Consequently, NASA has continued to operate below 
the level of the military In space. The relationship 
between the aerospace Industry and the military has been 
closely unified. After Kennedy was elected to the presidency, 
the Industrial contractors and the Air Force lobbied together 
for a.larger portion of the national effort In space. Trade 
Journals were heavily laden with articles favoring the Air 
Force's position on space policy. Thus, both the Army and 
the Air Force were being supported by nongovernmental
6l
service organizations and interested trade journals.
Because NASA was able to withstand this Air Force-industrial 
challenge, the space agency demonstrated that it could 
carry out a program as ambitious as the Apollo Project. 
Adversely, it revealed to both the Elsenhower and Kennedy 
administrations, as well as to following administrations, 
that NASA was not able to win significant support from its 
industrial constituency. This later proved to be suffi­
cient reason for diminishing NASA's budget even further.
For example, during Nixon's term as president in 1968,
NASA suffered a large budget cutback of approximately 
#1 billion. The aerospace industry's response to this 
sharp cutback was one of ambivalence. Military spending 
at this time had filled the gap in the aerospace work, and 
civilian aircraft manufacturing continued to rise to an 
all time high.
Therefore, NASA depended heavily upon the aero­
space industry, as a supplier and a beneficiary, for 
support, but did not receive that support to sustain 
growth. As a result, NASA's autonomy will remain in 
constant jeopardy unless some strong external support
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Is found.5 NASA, then, lost a great deal of support from 
its defense-oriented aerospace suppliers. For this reason, 
the space agency has undertaken many programs that have 
had direct military benefits. Hopefully, with more defense 
spin-offs, NASA's appropriations will increase in order 
for it to offer more contracts to the aerospace industry. 
"The problem, however, is that NASA remains threatened 
of being absorbed by its competitor, the DOD.**^
One major reason why NASA has lost vital support 
from the aerospace industry, as compared to aerospace- 
defense relationships, is that the civilian agency was not 
able to produce the space "spin-offs" that it had promised. 
With the exception of teflon frying pans, new bathtub 
calking compound, as well as other areas in medicine and 
communications, there were few spin-offs of an industrial 
nature. Willard F. Rockwell of North American Rockwell
^This may develop only if some external factor 
emerges in the organization's environment, e.g., increased 
Soviet activity in space which threatens to supercede 
the U. S. This may not be forthcoming in the near future 
after the major upset of the Russians losing three 
Cosmonauts in a recent flight. The Cosmonauts were sent 
into space on June 6, 1971, in Soyuz 11 and rendezvoused 
with their space station (Salyute) which had already been 
in orbit. They were found dead immediately after their capsule landed.
^The Civilian Defense Agency offers a good example of a bureau that was absorbed by its competitor, the 
Department of Defense. See Downs, Inside Bureaucracy,p. 10.
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stated that, "If you want to make money out of any Item on 
the commercial market, you have to spend weeks and months 
trying to figure out how you're going to get the cost down 
and then a profit. . . a lot of space stuff is too compli­
cated for civilian use."^ Therefore, the space program was 
not able to materialize on its promises of large amounts 
of technological transfer to the American public. Because 
of this minimal amount of technology transfer, NASA has 
begun to deemphasize economic "spin-offs" while at the 
same time maximizing the increasing benefits accruing from 
the space program for the military. NASA, then, has been 
forced into turning to the military for backing and support.
Another reason NASA has been operating below the 
DOD in space is because of the civilian space agency's 
patent policies. Probably the most debated provision in 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Act of 
1958 has been the one relating to patent policies. "NASA 
requires that all inventions developed with governmental 
funds are to be patented by the governmental agency in charge 
of the program."® Defending the principle, NASA states 
that if the use of public funds leads to an invention, the 
public should get the benefit without having to give a
^Cited in Kennan and Harvey, Mission to the Moon, p. 248.
pThe Atomic Energy Commission has a policy very 
similar to NASA's concerning patentable inventions.
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special reward to the private contractor. This policy 
was prevalent from 1958 up through the early Sixties, but 
has been changed to allow waivers on some patentable 
Inventions for private use as long as the contractor assures 
the government free access to them. Nevertheless, the 
Issue of patents Is still debated between NASA and Its 
contractors, especially the aerospace Industry. "Many times 
when firms do accept a NASA contract they will not assign 
their best personnel to work under them If they are denied 
patent r i g h t s . T h e  result has been that many firms seek 
contracts elsewhere, e.g., the DOD, which has a long estab­
lished policy on liberal patent decisions.
Much of the space Industry,and particularly the 
aerospace Industry, would rather accept defense-oriented 
space contracts because of the liberal patent policies 
and because DOD contracts often lead to longer production 
runs of the same Item allowing for a higher profit margin.
Memy students of the space program question why 
some defense-oriented aerospace contractors are still 
anxious to accept contracts with NASA.
One reason may be that companies such as North 
American Rockwell, McDonnell, and Boeing are manufacturing 
billions of dollars worth of defense materials annually.
9por further Information see Vernon Van Dyke, Pride 
and Power, the Rationale of the Space Program (Urbana, 111.* 
University of Illinois Press, 196^), pp. 219-220.
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with such heavy orders for war time equipment they must not 
overlook the pleasant public image offered by "peaceful** 
contracts with NASA such as the Apollo Project. These com­
panies do not advertise their work in radar, laser, and nu­
clear systems. Nor do they advertise their other hardware 
such as bombers, fighters and submarines. They do, however, 
advertise in the popular media such things as a two page 
full color ad dramatizing their efforts in putting a man 
on the moon.
A second reason that aerospace companies seek NASA 
contracts is because NASA generally utilizes only special­
ized units in its programs. This reduces the competitive­
ness among firms because many of the companies have technical 
capabilities in select areas. In the Department of Defense, 
contracts are highly competitive and firms often must take 
a low profit margin in order to gain a contract.
A third reason companies seek NASA contracts is be­
cause there are no penalties for failures. A good example 
of this was the Apollo 204 fire which killed Grissom, White, 
and Chaffee. Although North American Aviation was repri­
manded, e.g., some projects were canceled, the government 
absorbed most of the cost.
Still another explanation might be that NASA acts as 
a large Works Public Administration project. Its space 
programs need thousands of people. Many persons who were 
employed in the aerospace industry during World War II and
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the Korean War, found work with NASA. Thus, NASA, until 
recently, has been able to keep aerospace-defense employ­
ment at a high level.
Therefore, the aerospace industry is still closely 
related to NASA's future, but this relationship has been 
declining. Without the space industry's full support, NASA 
will continue to be in jeopardy. As a result, NASA has been 
constantly moving into a trend of more gradual development.
Anthony Downs describes this phenomenon as the 
"deceleration cycle of bureaus."^® In this cycle, a 
bureau may change from a period of rapid growth to a period 
of static development, which Downs refers to as conserver 
"dominance." A bureau shifting into this phase of the 
growth cycle generally reduces its ability to innovate and 
expand its functions. This can be cited in NASA's recent 
attempts to deemphasize economic "spin-offs" while point­
ing out the military benefits of the civilian space program. 
"Also, the fact that Congress and President Nixon have cut 
sharply into NASA's budget over the last several years accounts 
for the organization's desire to defend the present program 
as much as possible and deemphasize many of the projected
^®For further information see Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, pp. 13-14.
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space p r o g r a m s F u r t h e r m o r e ,  Downs believes that once a 
bureau begins to decelerate or experiences an abnormal slow­
down over a long period of time, it sets in motion forces 
that make It decelerate more rapidly.
With NASA's budget cut heavily It must push more for 
"cost effectiveness" and narrower profit margins for the 
aerospace Industry. With such Increased control over Indus­
try, firms will make greater efforts to evade such regulations 
or controls by seeking contracts with DOD, which has been 
the pattern over the past few years.
With a bare bones budget, NASA cannot achieve the 
space spectaculars that It once achieved In the Sixties* No 
longer will the clvlllsm space agency be able to utilize Im­
pressive feats to maintain support from Congress and the 
public • Now that NASA has placed a man on the moon It has 
only minimal support for further exploration of outer space*
As a result, NASA's development has continued to lessen over
A new project called "Pegasus" has not been openly 
approved by NASA. Pegasus, a bell shaped rocket transport 
11^ feet high, Is to Involve a reusable booster concept 
capable of delivering Saturn 5 payloads* Its projected use 
will Involve resupplying space stations while in orbit, and 
possibly transport materials to the moon vehicles to build 
a base there. It Is also projected to be used as a troop 
transport If modified. See Erland A. Kennan and Edmund Harvey, Mission to the Moon, pp. 251-2.
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the decade. Having lost much of its public support and 
support from Congress, the space agency's budget has drop­
ped to a low level and canceled projects and layoffs are 
more frequent. No longer will NASA be the prototype of 
the large scale government management projects because, now 
that the moon landing has been achieved, new emphasis will 
be upon the environment, e.g., air pollution. These recent 
governmental concerns will be approached with the same gusto 
as NASA met "space.**
Therefore, a failure of NASA to maintain its budget 
and long range space projects, the failure of its economic 
spin-offs to materialize for industry, and the impending 
threat of conversion to the military has meant that NASA 
has fallen short of its main objective as a functioning 
bureau. That is to say, NASA's security and autonomy are 
severely threatened and only with future support from exo­
genous sources in its environment, e.g., the aerospace 
industry, will NASA remain a viable civilian space agency 
in the future.
Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONI DECLINING REIGN OF THE CIVILIAN
SPACE AGENCY
As one of the most unique United States governmental 
agencies, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) has provided students of bureaucracies with many- 
interesting questions concerning the growth dsmamics of 
bureaus. It has been the purpose of this study to elaborate 
upon several of these questions— namely, Why was NASA able 
to achieve unusual rapid expansion as a young bureau ; and 
why, after this period of rapid acceleration, did NASA begin 
to decline? In providing some provisional answers to these 
questions the author has developed a major hypothesis drawn 
from a theoretical formulation by Anthony Downs. The hy­
pothesis states that changes in policy, function, and internal 
structure are a consequence of environmental forces. The 
author has sought to provide a documented case for the 
proposition that NASA's rapid growth and subsequent decline 
during the last decade was a function of laarge scale changes 
in external factors.
This documentation has been accomplished by analyz­
ing the impact of certain external variables considered 
by the author to have been the most important factors affect­
ing NASA's growth pattern. These are: international prestige,
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presidential Ideology, and other organizations, e.g., the 
aerospace Industry and the Defense Department. Each vari­
able has been analyzed In terms of propositions regarding 
that variable's Impact upon NASA's growth. Findings associ­
ated with these propositions have been well documented 
throughout the text.
Reviewing the relationship between the first two 
variables. I.e., International prestige and presidential 
Ideology, Chapter 2 demonstrates that both external factors 
have caused many changes to occur In NASA's growth pattern. 
For example, during Kennedy's Administration, the space pro­
gram shifted Its major policy advocating a purely scientific 
program to one promoting technological capability and engin­
eering "spectaculars" In order to Increase national Interest 
and International prestige for the United States. This was 
almost a direct reversal of the policies established by the 
more conservative Elsenhower Administration. In addition, 
the study has shown that because NASA was able to achieve 
Impressive space shots and gain International prestige. Its 
status became higher vls-a—vis other bureaus and it was 
able to obtain unusual Increments In appropriations from 
Congress. Such a shift In policy then— I.e., the switch 
from a science program to one emphasizing engineering--pro­
duced more support for the program and thus allowed It to 
expand even more readily- This study, thus, has supported 
the four propositions listed In Chapter 2% (1) The more
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the programs of a bureau contribute to national prestige, 
the higher its status vis-a-vis other bureaus; (2) the higher 
the status of a bureau, the less it must compete for funds 
with other bureaus; (3) the less a bureau must compete for 
funds, the faster it grows; and (4) perceptions of the presi­
dential role may alter the speed with which a bureau grows, 
i.e., the more conservative the president, the greater the 
restraint on growth.
Concerning the third variable, i.e., other organiza­
tions, this study has found that the role of the Defense 
Department (DOD) has been very important in determining NASA's 
development. For example, as the author has discussed in 
Chapter 3, the DOD has been a constant threat to NASA be­
cause it is both a functional and allocational rival of the 
civilian space agency. This was especially evident during 
NASA's early years of development because the Army, Navy, 
and the Air Force wished to take over the space agency's func­
tions of space exploration, but for military purposes. How­
ever, the fact that all three segments of the DOD were 
interested in NASA meant that much interdepartmental rivalry 
occurred. This was naturally an advantage to NASA as a 
young bureau because its officials did not have to face a 
tu^ified threat, but a divided one. This situation more or 
less confirms the proposition that the greater the number of 
competitors that seek to absorb the central goals of another 
agency, the lower the probability that the agency will be
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destroyed.
Chapter 3 also discusses the recent challenge of 
the DOD, primarily the Air Force division. Because of the 
increased lack of support from Congress and the President, 
the aerospace industry, and the American public, NASA has 
become weaker and thus even more fearful of annihilation 
or absorption by the DOD.^ This situation has led NASA 
officials to stress the importance of its program to Congress­
men as well as the American public. Pressure tactics such 
as reference to increased Soviet activity in space have 
been used. The additional efforts of NASA to stress mili­
tary benefits accruing from the space program have also 
been evident. Even the increased emphasis on science has 
been apparent in the media concerning the Apollo 15 mission 
to the moon. These facts sustain the other propositions also 
formulated in Chapter 3. The first states that during peri­
ods of growth, agencies resort to imperialism or logrolling 
in order to survive. The second states that in periods of 
decline, the more an agency logrolls, the better its cap­
acity to defend its core interests against the imperialism 
of former rivals•
In Chapter 4 the author has shown the relationship 
between the aerospace industry and NASA. As discussed in 
that chapter, the aerospace industry deals mainly in
^Por reasons regarding NASA's lack of support see Chapter 2•
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contracts with the Defense Department and NASA. Because 
the aerospace industry has become increasingly disenchanted 
with NASA, it has developed even closer ties with its much
Olarger customer, the Department of Defense (DOD). This 
situation is very similar to the one which occurred at the 
outset of NASA's development. At that time, the aerospace 
industry developed close relationships with the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force in their various roles in the space program. 
When NASA finally became established, the space industry 
eventually became more dependent upon the space agency, 
although always maintaining their primary relationship with 
the DOD. Now, the space industry, dur to the slowdown and 
other factors, is seeking less contracts with NASA and is 
becoming even more dependent on the DOD. As a result of the 
aerospace industry's weakening support for NASA, the space 
agency has become even more fearful of the military. This 
has had an enormous effect on the space agency. NASA has 
responded to this situation by shifting major goals in the 
organization. For example, a major shift In policy can be 
seen in the deemphasis of space spectaculars and industrial 
"spin-offs,** e.g., teflon frying pans, to one stressing 
scientific and military benefits of the space program. The 
move to increase the scientific aspect of the space program 
has been evident in the planning of the Apollo 15 mission.
2For more information concerning why the aerospace 
industry became disenchanted with NASA, see Chapter 4.
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By such a shift in policy, NASA hopes to regain full 
support from Congress and the American public* With this 
support, the space agency will be able to again expand 
and offer additional industrial contracts, thus hopefully 
regaining more support from the aerospace industries* 
Therefore, in reviewing the relationship between the 
aerospace industry, the Defense Department, and NASA, this 
study has found that, first, the greater the number of 
competitors seeking to absorb an agency, the lower the 
probability that the suppliers and beneficiaries of that 
agency will support it. And second, the stronger a 
bureau's competitors, the less likely the bureau's suppliers 
and beneficiaries will support that bureau*
This study, then, has provided a detailed analysis 
of NASA's overall growth and decline since its creation in
1958. Reasons behind the causes of NASA's undulating 
growth pattern have been examined and found to be related 
to external forces in the space agency's environment*
That is to say that changes in policy, function, and 
internal structure of NASA have been a consequence of 
environmental forces. Therefore, we can conclude from 
this study that NASA's rapid growth and subsequent decline 
during the last decade was a function of large scale 
changes in external factors.
Realizing the impact of environmental forces upon 
NASA's growth and development, this author can perhaps
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make some projections as to what will happen to NASA in 
the future. Although highly speculative, some major 
changes will need to be forthcoming if NASA is going to 
survive its present slowdown. Already NASA officials are 
taking steps to recover the space agency's fallen image 
among Americans. Increased media coverage of all space 
shots with special emphasis on their scientific achieve­
ments is now being undertaken.3 Hopefully, according to 
NASA officials, this scientific base behind the space 
shots will provide Americans with a more concrete reason 
to support the expensive space program. This increased 
emphasis on the scientific aspect of the space program 
should help NASA regain vital support from Congress and 
the American public.
Such a revitalization of the space program should 
also be enhanced by the increased Soviet activity in 
space. For example, several months ago the Soviets 
launched Mars-2, which was described by the official Soviet 
news agency Tass, as being an automatic interplanetary 
station. Although it was not determined by U. S. authori­
ties whether Mars-2 would attempt a soft landing on Mars, 
it is known that the vehicle is scheduled to reach the
3rhe Apollo 15 moon flight is set for July 26, 1971 
and is expected to determine whether all the moon craters 
were created by meteor impact, or whether some are volcanic 
David R. Scott, Commander of the flight, has stated that 
"Apollo 15 will be the most singular scientific expedition ever conducted."
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planet by November.
Other Soviet activity includes the permanent manned 
orbital space station, Salyute. The Russians, however, 
suffered a major setback in this program when a tiny hole 
in the wall off Soyuz 11, the spaceship which had docked 
temporarily with Salyute, caused the deaths of three 
Soviet Cosmonauts on July 3» 1971- This tragedy will 
probably have the effect of making future U. S. space shots 
more interesting because Americans again have become aware 
of the dangers in manned space flight. Such interest will 
nonetheless eventually wear off unless the Soviets resume 
their increased role in space. If this trend should 
continue, the United States governmental officials may 
again turn to NASA to meet the Russian challenge in space.
As it now stands. Project Skylab will follow 
Apollo. Skylab is a three-man earth orbiting laboratory 
that is more advanced than the present Soviet Salyute 
station. Future plans include three different three-man 
crews, flying modified Apollo command ships, to visit this 
laboratory for periods up to fifty-six days in 1973.
They will be conducting scientific, engineering, and medical 
experiments.
Following Skylab, projections are for a reusable 
space shuttle called Pegasus, which will fly like an 
airliner on repeated trips to and from space. But this
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program's future Is very uncertain. Congress has been 
increasingly conservative with funds for manned space 
flight— and the earliest NASA can now hope to have an 
operational shuttle program is 1978 or 1979-
Therefore, NASA's future rests with the amount of 
funding it will be able to receive from Congress. Such 
funding, as in the past, will depend heavily upon large 
scale changes in external forces, e.g., increased Soviet 
challenge in space. Congress' support will also depend 
upon the aerospace industry's willingness to sustain 
their backing for NASA, as well as the mood of the American 
public toward future expensive space projects. If NASA 
is not able to receive support from these sectors in the 
next five years, the author feels that the civilian space 
agency will eventually be absorbed by its larger competitor 
— the Department of Defense. NASA's fear of being absorbed 
by the military is certainly Justified because the Defense 
Department has desired a larger share of the space program 
since the civilian agency's creation.
This thesis has examined the major causes behind 
NASA's rapid growth and subsequent decline since its 
creation in 1958. From the analysis I have concluded that 
changes in policy, function, and the internal structure 
of the space agency are a consequence of changes in 
external variables--namely, international prestige,
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presidential ideology, and other organizations, e.g., the 
aerospace industry and the Defense Department. I have 
also made several projections as to what may happen to 
NASA in the future on the basis of what I have learned 
from material gathered for the study.
This thesis, however, provides only a starting 
point for the myriad of subjects relating to the growth 
dynamics of NASA. Other studies might include a review 
of basic theoretical propositions outlined by Anthony 
Downs in his book Inside Bureaucracy, but modified to 
relate to the space agency- Examples of these propositions 
are I (1) As NASA grew larger, the average level of talent 
therein initially rose, and then declined; (2) the rapid 
growth of NASA's social functions led to a cumulative
change in the character of its personnel which tended to
accelerate its rate of growth still further; (3) decline 
or relative stagnation of NASA's social functions has led 
to a cumulative change in the character of its personnel 
which has tended to decelerate its growth still further.
Such theoretical propositions as these may be studied
by other students of bureaucracies in order to gain a
better understanding of not only the growth dynamics of 
NASA, but of other similar bureaus as well.
Therefore, NASA has provided an interesting study 
of the internal growth dynamics of a governmental bureau.
Its future as a civilian space agency still remains
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tmcertaln, and thus It will continue to be of* interest to 
political scientists and public administrators for some time 
to come. As it now stands, without further external de­
velopments, such as a new Soviet challenge in space, the 
space agency will not obtain the support needed to keep it 
alive. If this should result, and NASA becomes an 
appendage to the Defense Department, its future as a 
civilian space agency will be bleak, and eventually it 
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SELECTED CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR SPACE EVENTS
1957'
Oct. 4 Sputnik I, USSR, first earth satellite.
Nov. 3 Sputnik II, USSR satellite; carried first
live dog— Laika.
19581
Jan. 31 Explorer I, U.S. satellite ; discovered Van 
Allen Belt.
Mar. 17 Vanguard I, U.S. satellite ; solar powered 
transmitters•
May 15 Sputnik III, USSR satellite ; orbiting geo­
physical laboratory.
Oct. 1 United States establishes National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA).
1959
Sept. 12 Luna II, USSR moon probe; first probe to 
impact moon.
Oct. 4 Luna III, USSR moon probe ; took first photo­
graphs of the far side of moon.
1960















Echo 1, U.S. satellite; a 100 foot di­
ameter balloon in orbit, producing first 
passive communication satellite.
Vostok I, USSR satellite; contained Yuri 
Gagarin, first man to orbit the earth. 
Mercury "Freedom 7»” U.S., suborbital 
flight of Alan 3. Shepard, Jr- 
Mercury "Liberty Bell 7»" U.S., subor­
bital flight of Virgil I. Grissom.
Vostok II, USSR satellite; contained 
Gherman S. Titov; completed 77 orbits.
Mercury "Friendship 7»" U.S. satellite; 
John H. Glenn, Jr., first U.S. man to 
orbit the earth.
Telestar I, U.S. satellite ; first com­
mercially financed communications satel­
lite .
Vostok III, USSR satellite; Andrian G. 
Nikolayev; Vostoks III and IV approached 
within 3 miles of each other.
Vostok IV, USSR satellite; Pavel R. 
Pooovich.
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Oct. 3 Mercury ”Sigma 7," U.S. satellite; Walter
Schirra, Jr.; first splashdown in detailed 
re-entry zone.
Dec. 1^ Mariner 2, U.S. Venus prohe; passed within
22,000 miles of Venus.
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May 15-16 Mercury "Faith 7," U.S. satellite; L.
Gordon Cooper, Jr.; 22 orhits— longest 
Mercury flight.
June 14-19 Vostok V, USSR satellite ; Valery F. By­
kovsky; 81 orbits.
June 16-19 Vostok VI, USSR satellite; Valentina V.
Tereshkova, first woman in space.
'64
July 28 Ranger 7, U.S. moon probe; photographed
face of moon before impact.
Oct. 12 Voskhod I, USSR satellite; first 3-man
spacecraft ; Vladimir M. Komarov, Kon­
stantin P. Feoktistov, Boris B. Yegorov.
'65
Mar- 18 Voskhod 2, USSR satellite; Pavel I. Bel­
yayev and Alexei A. Leonov; first "walk 
in space."
Mar. 23 Gemini 3, U.S. satellite; Virgil I. Grissom
97
and John W. Young; first test of a Gemini 
spacecraft.
Apr. 23 Molniya lA, USSR satellite; first USSR
communications satellite.
June 3-7 Gemini 4, U.S. satellite ; James A- Mc-
Divitt and Edward H. White II; White per­
formed first U.S. "walk in space."
July l4 Mariner 4, U.S. Mars probe; launched
Nov. 28, 1964; passed within 6,200 miles 
of Mars.
Aug. 21-29 Gemini 5» U.S. satellite; Leroy G . Cooper
and Charles Conrad, Jr.; completed 120 
orbits.
Dec. 4-18 Gemini 7, U.S. satellite ; Frank Borman
and James A. Lovell, Jr.; 220 orbits.
Dec. 15-16 Gemini 6, U.S. satellite; Walter M.
Schirra, Jr., and Thomas P. Stafford; 
first rendezvous in space.
1966
Jan. 31 Luna IX, USSR lunar probe; first soft
landing on moon; transmitted photographs 
of surface.
Mar. 16-17 Gemini 8 , U.S. satellite; Neil A. Arm­
strong and David R. Scott ; first docking 
in space with previously launched target 
vehicle.
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Mar. 31 Lima X, USSR limar probe; first probe
to achieve lunar orbit.
May 30 Surveyor 1, U.S. lunar probe ; first U.S.
probe to soft land on the moon.
July 18-21 Gemini 10, U.S. satellite; John W. Young
and Michael Collins; rendezvoused with 
Gemini 8 target vehicle; first retrieval 
of a space object (a test package on 
target vehicle).
1967
Jan. 27 Apollo AS-204, U.S. lunar spacecraft,
Roger B. Chaffee, Virgil I. Grissom, and 
Edward H. White II, killed in flash fire 
in the spacecraft test center at Cape 
Canaveral.
Apr- 23 Soyuz I, USSR satellite ; Vladimir Komarov
killed on April 24 in recovery phase.
Oct. 18 Venera IV, USSR Venus probe; launched
June 12; ejected an 884 pound capsule
to the surface; returned data on the planet's
atmosphere.
Oct. 19 Mariner 5» U.S. Venus probe ; launched June
14; passed within 2_$,000 miles of Venus.
Oct. 26-30 Cosmos 186, 188, USSR satellites ; first
automatic rendezvous and docking.
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Nov* 9 Apollo 4, U.S. satellite; first flight
of Saturn V launch vehicle.
1968
Apr. 22 Space rescue treaty signed by 43 nations,
including the U.S., U.K., and USSR; 
provided for international cooperation 
in emergency assistance to space travel­
ers .
Sept. 15 Zond V, USSR moon probe; first unmanned
round trip flight to the moon.
Oct. 11-22 Apollo 7i U.S.; Walter M. Schirra, Jr.,
Donn F. Eisele, R. Walter Cunningham; 
first manned test of Apollo command module ; 
first live TV transmissions from orbit.
Oct. 26-30 Soyuz III, USSR, George T. Beregovoi;
first manned rendezvous and possible 
docking by a Soviet cosmonaut.
Dec. 21-27 Apollo 8, U.S.; Frank Borman, James A.
Lovell, Jr., William A. Anders; first 
spacecraft in circumlunar orbit.
1969
Jan. 14-17 Soyuz IV, USSR, Vladamir A. Shatalov;
rendezvoused and docked with So3ruz V.
Jan. 15-18 Soyuz V, USSR; Boris V. Volynov, Aleksei







rendezvoused and docked with Soyuz IV. 
Apollo 9» U.S.; James A. McDiwitt,
David R. Scott, Russell L. Schwelkart; 
first descent to within 9 miles of the 
moon * s surface.
Apollo 11, U.S.; Nell A- Armstrong, Edwin
E. Aldrln, Jr.; Michael Collins; first 
manned landing on the moon.
Soyuz VI, USSR; Geogly Shonln, Valrly 
Kabasov; one of three spacecraft and 
seven men put Into earth orbit simultane­
ously for first time.
SoyuzVCI, USSR; Anatoley Fllipchenko, 
Viktor Gorbakov, Vladislav Volkov; part 
of Soyuz series VI, VII, VIII- 
Soyuz VIII, USSR; Vladimir Shatalov, 
Aleksey Yeliseyev; part of Soyuz series 
VI, VII, VIII.
Apollo 12, U.S.; Charles Conrad, Jr., 
Richard F. Gordon, Jr., Alan Bean; second 
manned lunar landing mission; Investi­
gated Surveyor 3 spacecraft.
1970
Apr. 11-17 Apollo 13, U.S.; James A. Lovell, Jr., 
Fred W. Raise, Jr., John L. Swlgert, Jr.; 
third manned lunar landing, but attempt
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June 1-17
was aborted due to malfunctions while 
the astronauts were on their way to the 
moon.
Soyuz IX, USSR; Andreiyan Nikolayez,
Vitaly SevastianoTT; designed to test man's 
ability to withstand long periods of 
weightlessness; 28? orbits.
1971







Apollo 14, U.S.; Alan B . Shepard, Edgar 
Mitchell, Stuart Roosen, Jr.; performed 
seismographic tests on the moon.
Salyute I, USSR ; permanent orbital labor­
atory-
Soyuz X, USSR; Vladamir A- Shatalov, 
Aleksei S. Yeliseyev, Nikolai Rukavish- 
rikov; rendezvoused and docked with 
Salyute.
Soyuz XI, USSR; Georgy Dobrovolsky, 
Vladislav Volkov, Viktor Patsayev; killed 
during reentry phase.
Apollo 15» U.S.; David R. Scott, Alfred 
H. Worden, James 3. Irvin; lunar landing 
mission; exploration of moon's terrain.
